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The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

Description:

This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.

In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.

The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.

Read more

Review

"Richard Swinburne is famous for arguing from the conceivability of my disembodiment to my having an immaterial part. Weir's argument is not open to the criticisms levelled against Swinburne's, and the engine driving the argument is entirely different and entirely original. I was very impressed."

Dean Zimmerman, Rutgers University

"If you thought substance dualism was confined to history, then think again. Ralph Weir has developed one of the most compelling arguments for mental substance in contemporary philosophy. Essential reading for anybody working on the problem of consciousness."

Philip Goff, Durham University

"Weir shows that recent philosophy of mind is hampered by an unreflective abhorrence for the idea of the soul – an attitude which is at odds with serious reflection on the mind-body problem. A vastly important book for anyone serious about understanding human nature."

Benedikt Paul Göcke, Ruhr University Bochum

"Weir hasn’t only contributed to the recent philosophy of mind. Moreover, he has given a profound insight into the question of the meaning of life. Hence, the real importance of this book, not only for philosophers, but also for every contemplating individual."

Marija Selak Raspudić, University of Zagreb

"An extremely important defence of substance dualism. Weir aims his critique at the growing trend toward property dualism. He rigorously works through the analytical literature to show that property dualism, while headed in the right direction, embarrassingly has no advantage over substance dualism."

Joshua Farris, Author of The Creation of Self and An Introduction to Theological Anthropology

"Weir has produced a compelling challenge to the current dogma that property dualism should be preferred to substance dualism. His book is one that no party to the contemporary mind-body debate can afford to ignore."

Alex Moran, Philosophical Quarterly

“Ralph Weir’s book is without a doubt an outstanding and very important contribution to the metaphysics of mind.”

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

About the Author

Ralph Stefan Weir is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln and Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford. His recent publications include "Bring Back Substances!" (Review of Metaphysics, 2021), "Can a Post-Galilean Science of Consciousness Avoid Substance Dualism?" (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021), and "Does Idealism Solve the Problem of Consciousness?" (Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism, 2021).

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The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

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Unless otherwise stated, all prices displayed on the product page include applicable taxes and import duties.

BOLO operates in accordance with the laws and regulations of United Arab Emirates. Any items found to be restricted or prohibited for sale within the United Arab Emirates will be cancelled prior to shipment. We take proactive measures to ensure that only products permitted for sale in United Arab Emirates are listed on our website.

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Visit the Routledge Store

The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)

Product ID: K1032457694
Condition: New
The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy)-0
Type: Paperback

AED31767

Price includes VAT & Import Duties
Availability: In Stock

Quantity:

|

Order today to get by 7-14 business days

This item qualifies for free delivery

Returns & Warranty policies

Imported From: United Kingdom

At BOLO, we work hard to ensure the products you receive are new, genuine, and sourced from reputable suppliers.

Every product in the BOLO catalogue is sourced through our Verified Global Supply Network of verified sellers, authorized distributors or directly from the manufacturer.

Each product undergoes thorough inspection and verification at our consolidation and fulfilment centers to ensure it meets our strict authenticity and quality standards before being shipped and delivered to you.

If you ever have concerns regarding the authenticity of a product purchased from us, please contact Bolo Support. We will review your inquiry promptly and, if necessary, provide documentation verifying authenticity or offer a suitable resolution.

Your trust is our top priority, and we are committed to maintaining transparency and integrity in every transaction.

While we strive to display accurate information, variations in packaging, labeling, instructions, or formulation may occasionally occur due to regional differences or supplier updates. For detailed or manufacturer-specific information, please contact the brand directly or reach out to BOLO Support for assistance.

Unless otherwise stated, all prices displayed on the product page include applicable taxes and import duties.

BOLO operates in accordance with the laws and regulations of United Arab Emirates. Any items found to be restricted or prohibited for sale within the United Arab Emirates will be cancelled prior to shipment. We take proactive measures to ensure that only products permitted for sale in United Arab Emirates are listed on our website.

All items are shipped by air, and any products classified as “Dangerous Goods (DG)” under IATA regulations will be removed from the order and cancelled.

All orders are processed manually, and we make every effort to process them promptly once confirmed. Products cancelled due to the above reasons will be permanently removed from listings across the website.

Description:

This book evaluates the widespread preference in philosophy of mind for varieties of property dualism over other alternatives to physicalism. It takes the standard motivations for property dualism as a starting point and argues that these lead directly to nonphysical substances resembling the soul of traditional metaphysics.

In the first half of the book, the author clarifies what is at issue in the choice between theories that posit nonphysical properties only and those that posit nonphysical substances. The crucial question, he argues, is whether one posits nonphysical things that satisfy an Aristotelian-Cartesian independence definition of substance: nonphysical things that could exist in the absence of anything else. In the second half, the author argues that standard and Russellian monist forms of property dualism are far less plausible than we usually suppose. Most significantly, the presuppositions of one of the leading arguments for property dualism, the conceivability argument, lead by parity of reasoning to the view that conscious subjects are nonphysical substances. He concludes that if you posit nonphysical properties in response to the mind-body problem, then you should be prepared to posit nonphysical substances as well. Mainstream philosophy of mind must take nonphysical substances far more seriously than it has done for the best part of a century.

The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.

Read more

Review

"Richard Swinburne is famous for arguing from the conceivability of my disembodiment to my having an immaterial part. Weir's argument is not open to the criticisms levelled against Swinburne's, and the engine driving the argument is entirely different and entirely original. I was very impressed."

Dean Zimmerman, Rutgers University

"If you thought substance dualism was confined to history, then think again. Ralph Weir has developed one of the most compelling arguments for mental substance in contemporary philosophy. Essential reading for anybody working on the problem of consciousness."

Philip Goff, Durham University

"Weir shows that recent philosophy of mind is hampered by an unreflective abhorrence for the idea of the soul – an attitude which is at odds with serious reflection on the mind-body problem. A vastly important book for anyone serious about understanding human nature."

Benedikt Paul Göcke, Ruhr University Bochum

"Weir hasn’t only contributed to the recent philosophy of mind. Moreover, he has given a profound insight into the question of the meaning of life. Hence, the real importance of this book, not only for philosophers, but also for every contemplating individual."

Marija Selak Raspudić, University of Zagreb

"An extremely important defence of substance dualism. Weir aims his critique at the growing trend toward property dualism. He rigorously works through the analytical literature to show that property dualism, while headed in the right direction, embarrassingly has no advantage over substance dualism."

Joshua Farris, Author of The Creation of Self and An Introduction to Theological Anthropology

"Weir has produced a compelling challenge to the current dogma that property dualism should be preferred to substance dualism. His book is one that no party to the contemporary mind-body debate can afford to ignore."

Alex Moran, Philosophical Quarterly

“Ralph Weir’s book is without a doubt an outstanding and very important contribution to the metaphysics of mind.”

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

About the Author

Ralph Stefan Weir is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln and Associate Member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford. His recent publications include "Bring Back Substances!" (Review of Metaphysics, 2021), "Can a Post-Galilean Science of Consciousness Avoid Substance Dualism?" (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2021), and "Does Idealism Solve the Problem of Consciousness?" (Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism, 2021).

Details:

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